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Persecution Restitution
REMOVING THE JURISDICTIONAL ROADBLOCKS
TO TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
In 2012, on the route from Damascus to Aleppo, Noura AlJizawi was ripped from a bus by armed men who held a gun to her
chest and threw her into a waiting car.1 For more than a month,
Al-Jizawi’s family was unaware that she had been kidnapped by
Syrian forces and was being held in solitary confinement at a
government prison authorized by Syria’s President Bashar alAssad.2 While detained, Al-Jizawi endured unimaginable acts of
torture at the hands of her captors.3 Al-Jizawi was whipped by wire
cords, electrocuted, burned, hung by her feet, and had her body
stretched and distorted by a “German Chair.”4 When she was not
being tortured, Al-Jizawi was forced to watch others suffer from
similarly horrific treatment.5 While the prisoners were not fed
often, when they were, prison guards threw food that was
frequently contaminated with hair and urine at the detainees, who
were forced to eat from the floor without utensils.6
Al-Jizawi’s experiences during the Syrian civil war are not
uncommon, as a report from Amnesty International estimates
that at least seventeen thousand people have been killed in

1 Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Scholar-at-Risk: U of T’s Noura Al-Jizawi, A Key Player
in the Syrian Uprising, Became an Opposition Leader, U OF T NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://
www.utoronto.ca/news/scholar-risk-u-t-s-noura-al-jizawi-key-player-syrian-uprisingbecame-opposition-leader [https://perma.cc/P48S-CKGH]; Hollie McKay, Syrians Describe
Torture Inside Assad Prisons: ‘Death is Much Better Than This,’ FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.foxnews.com/world/syrians-describe-torture-inside-assad-prisons-death-ismuch-better-than-this [https://perma.cc/T7SS-HDY9].
2 Ahmed-Ullah, supra note 1; McKay, supra note 1.
3 Ahmed-Ullah, supra note 1.
4 Id.; McKay, supra note 1. The “German Chair” is a seat that can be shifted so
that victims’ bodies are stretched and left with permanent injuries. Josh Robbins, Seven Isis
Torture Methods Revealed Include the ‘Flying Carpet’ and the ‘German Chair,’ INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017, 5:20 PM BST), https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/seven-isis-torture-methodsrevealed-include-flying-carpet-german-chair-1635289 [https://perma.cc/CN4T-SYBJ].
5 Ahmed-Ullah, supra note 1.
6 McKay, supra note 1.
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Syrian prisons since 2011.7 In fact, members of Al-Jizawi’s
immediate family, along with sixty-five thousand other people,
have been arrested by al-Assad’s government forces.8 Guards at
these prisons beat, shock, burn, rape and otherwise physically
torture prisoners.9 In rooms of less than one-hundred square feet,
there may be more than fifty people who must compete for space
and air.10 Cells are so small that some released detainees have
reported that they would want to get beaten so they “could [leave
the cell] and breathe” because “[t]he punishment was easier than
the smell, and the atmosphere.”11 The lack of medical care within
the prisons contributes to more suffering and death.12 Reports of
doctors ignoring prisoners’ medical conditions, guards soaking
wounds to increase the chance the wounds get infected, and
intentional infliction of mental anguish are all commonplace in
the torture camps.13
While the heinous acts described above are offensive to
humanity, it is not clear that the victims will ever achieve justice
against their captors and their leaders. As one might imagine,
Syrian courts, especially while under the control and influence
of the al-Assad regime, are not a sympathetic or realistic forum
for victims who wish to assert their claims of torture.14 For most
victims, the lack of access to local courts will be enough to
prevent them from ever bringing claims, but some Syrians have
turned to European courts for relief.15
Still, others may seek justice in the United States under
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which
provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over
extraterritorial torture claims.16 Asserting a TVPA claim,
7 The Horror of Syria’s Torture Prisons, AMNESTY INT’L UK (Feb. 16, 2017, 10:11
AM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/horror-syrias-torture-prisons [https://perma.cc/L8YS-4RHJ].
8 Id.; Ahmed-Ullah, supra note 1.
9 The Horror of Syria’s Torture Prisons, supra note 7.
10 See id.
11 Priyanka Motaparthy & Nadim Houry, If the Dead Could Speak: Mass Deaths and
Torture in Syria’s Detention Facilities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 16, 2015) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Human Rights Watch interview with
Mundhar, Turkey, June 14, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-couldspeak/mass-deaths-and-torture-syrias-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/FC5G-8AYX].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Suddaf Chaudry, Syria’s Justice System: ‘Working Without a Written Law,’
ARAB WKLY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://thearabweekly.com/syrias-justice-system-workingwithout-written-law [https://perma.cc/5QP9-R2KN].
15 Deborah Amos, With Syria’s War Nearly Over, Victims Take the Battle to
European Courts, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 13, 2018, 5:06 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2018/08/13/637093319/with-syrias-war-nearly-over-victims-take-the-battle-to-europeancourts [https://perma.cc/BSM7-YT52].
16 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
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however, may be impossible because establishing personal
jurisdiction in this context is difficult. Even if the victims were
to apply Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which sometimes provides personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants, the contacts that the potential defendants have with
the United States are likely insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.17 Thus, it is likely that, despite acts that fall
squarely within the purview of the TVPA, these human rights
offenders will escape both criminal and civil liability.
This note argues that the TVPA is unable to serve its
intended purpose of creating a civil remedy for those who suffer
from human rights violations at the hands of foreign defendants
because those defendants will rarely be subject to the jurisdiction
of United States courts. Without jurisdiction, the TVPA becomes
toothless and unenforceable, leaving victims of torture without
recourse or redress. If the legislative branch of the federal
government truly believes that it is the United States’
responsibility to hold torturers accountable, the judicial and
legislative branches must create an easier route for establishing
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Expanding the
reach of Rule 4(k)(2) to provide a constitutional carve out would
allow torture victims to seek justice even if their offenders lacked
the requisite contacts with the United States.
This note proceeds in the following four parts. Part I of
this note outlines the history, purpose, and elements of the
TVPA with examples from case law. Part II reviews the
requirements for establishing personal jurisdiction with an
emphasis on foreign defendants. Part III surveys a variety of
potential solutions that could cure deficiencies when applying
the TVPA. Finally, Part IV advocates that rewriting Rule 4(k)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide a
constitutional carve out would best solve the jurisdictional
problem when applying the TVPA.
I.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TVPA

A.

Passing the TVPA and its Legislative History

Senator Arlen Specter first introduced the TVPA on June 6,
1986.18 After many hearings, reintroductions, and favorable votes,
the TVPA was enacted on March 12, 1992 during the Second
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2); see also Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 849–50 (11th
Cir. 2010) (discussing contacts required to assert jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)).
18 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2 (1991).
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Session of the 102nd Congress.19 Before voting to confirm the bill,
legislators considered the intent of the proposed bill. Specifically,
the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report indicated that the
“legislation will carry out the intent of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment,20 which was ratified by the U.S. Senate on October
27, 1990.”21 The committee outlined the need for legislation by
stating that “[o]fficial torture and summary execution violate
standards accepted by virtually every nation. This universal
consensus condemning these practices has assumed the status of
customary international law.”22 The committee then contrasted
these condemnations with current practices in many nations who
“still engage in or tolerate torture.”23
To justify the applicability of the TVPA with regards to
extraterritorial actions, the committee indicated that those nations
who allow, promote, or engage in torture are the same nations that
do not “adhere[ ] to the rule of law” and therefore do not provide
adequate remedies for victims.24 In conjunction with the Alien Tort
Claims Act, which was enacted in 1789,25 federal district courts
would be able to hear TVPA cases by “establish[ing] an
unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been successfully
maintained under an existing law.”26 The committee also made clear
that the TVPA would establish remedies for aliens and U.S citizens,
unlike the ATCA, which was only available for use by aliens.27
The committee report went on to explain various elements
and requirements that must be present for a successful TVPA
claim.28 The most important part of the “Analysis of Legislation” is
found in the “Who can be sued” section of the report.29 The first
19 See id. at 2–3 (1991); TVPA, 106 Stat. 73. The bill was reintroduced in 1987 and
1989 and on June 22, 1990, the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs held a
hearing regarding the legislation. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2 (1991). On July 19, 1990, the
subcommittee voted favorably 2-1. Id. On January 31, 1991, Senator Specter again
reintroduced the bill and the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably voice voted. Id. at 2–3.
20 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, Apr. 18, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The Convention
recounts the evolution of war before claiming that “the prohibition of torture and
inhuman treatment or punishment has been established as a standard for the protection
for all persons, in time of peace as well as war.” S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 1.
21 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 3–4.
25 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
26 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991).
27 Id. at 5 (“[W]hile the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the
TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”).
28 Id. at 6–11.
29 Id. at 6–8.
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sentence of the section provides that a United States court must
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant in order for that
defendant to be sued.30 Next, the report clarifies that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)31 is still valid and the
TVPA applies only to “individuals,” which does not include foreign
states or their entities.32 FSIA will not, however, provide a defense
for a former official in a TVPA claim.33 Similarly, a defendant would
not be able to assert an “act of state” defense, because every state
is formally against torture and therefore no act of torture could ever
be considered an act of public policy.34 Taken together, a defendant
in a TVPA claim must be an individual—and not a state or its
entity—over whom a U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction.
The report also included the minority views of Senator Alan
Simpson and Senator Chuck Grassley who, despite condemning
torture around the globe, believed that the proposed legislation was
“not an appropriate way to remedy foreign acts of torture.”35 First,
the minority argued that the bill “[was] in tension with the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”36 Namely, the convention
required every country to provide a remedy for torture, so the
TVPA’s extraterritorial application seemed to violate the United
Nations treaty.37 Second, the minority argued that Congress did not
have the authority to create a private right of action for events that
took place abroad.38 Third, there was a forum non conveniens
argument that parties should not have their dispute adjudicated in
a location that required logistical problems of subpoenaing witnesses
and moving evidence.39 Lastly, the minority who opposed the bill
pointed to the potential for a foreign policy problem, an issue that
the executive branch raised, by allowing an alien to have “a foreign
nation judged by a U.S. court.”40 This, the minority argued, could
lead to hostile foreign nations retaliating against U.S. citizens.41
Id. at 7.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891
(1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2012)).
32 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991).
33 Id. at 8.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 13.
36 Id.
37 Id.; see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, Apr. 18, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 116 (“Each State
Party shall ensure . . . that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation. . . . In the event of the death of the
victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.”).
38 S. REP. No. 102-249, at 14 (1991).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 15.
41 Id.
30

31
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Despite the minority’s opposition, Congress passed the TVPA, and it
has been in effect for twenty seven years.42 Thus, Congress, through
the TVPA, empowered federal courts to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over cases involving extrajudicial killings or torture.
B.

Elements of a TVPA Claim with Examples

Though the TVPA only allows for civil remedies for either
torture or extrajudicial killing, the statute has the potential to be
powerful because of its extraterritorial application.43 The TVPA
defines two actionable torts.44 First, it provides a cause of action for
an “individual’s legal representative, or to any person who may be a
claimant in an action for wrongful death” when a person has died
due to an “extrajudicial killing.”45 The statute defines an
extrajudicial killing as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”46 An extrajudicial killing
however, “does not include any such killing that, under international
law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.”47
Second, in addition to providing a cause of action for one’s
legal representative when the represented person is killed
extrajudicially, the statute also allows individuals to recover
damages in a civil suit for torture.48 The statute defines torture as:
(1) . . . any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody
or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain
or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third
person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act
that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting from—

42 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
43 See Human Rights, in BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW at III.E-28 (Am.
Soc’y Int’l L., Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/
benchbook/ASIL_Benchbook_Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ94-GZ54].
44 TVPA 106 Stat. 73.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality.49

Though the definitions are thorough, courts have been forced to
decide whether acts fit within the non-exhaustive framework of the
statute. In Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, for example, where an officer beat
the plaintiffs with kicks and blows to the face and genitals and
pulled teeth, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia held that the officer’s actions fit within the TVPA
definition of torture because the beatings caused severe pain and
suffering.50 Similarly, in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that leaving
individuals in cells alone without water or beds for days and
threatening electrocution by attaching a wire to a man’s testicles
constituted torture.51 The court reasoned that such deprivations of
basic human necessities fulfilled the definition of torture.52While
these two cases illustrate the types of actions that the TVPA
condemns, unfortunately, TVPA claims are frequently dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds.53
In other cases, courts have denied defining certain actions
as torture. For instance, in Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
declined to hold that a cruise ship passenger who was “interrogated
and then held incommunicado, threatened with death . . . if [she]
moved from the quarters [where she was] held, and forcibly
separated from her husband . . . [and unable] to learn of his welfare

Id. at 73–74.
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345–47 (N.D. Ga. 2002). Specifically,
the court noted, “[t]hese beatings included kicks and blows to the face, genitals . . . [defendants]
disfigured [plaintiff] and may have broken his ribs and caused him nearly to lose consciousness
and to be unable to eat.” Id. at 1345.
51 Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2000).
52 Id.
53 See discussion infra Section II.A.
49

50
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or his whereabouts” had suffered from torture.54 In Mohammed v.
Bin Tarraf¸ allegations of “threats, harassment, discriminatory
treatment, confiscation of . . . property, and imprisonment” were,
without pointing to specific instances of mistreatment, not enough
to satisfy the TVPA torture definition.55 Similarly, pushing,
shoving, and hair pulling during an eight-hour detention in Aldana
v. Del Monte Fresh Produce fell short of torture.56
In addition to requiring that a plaintiff sufficiently plead and
prove “torture,” the TVPA places other limitations on opportunities
for recovery.57 For a claim to be actionable, the torture must be
carried out by “[a]n individual who acts, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”58 In 2012, the United
States Supreme Court, after employing the “ordinary meaning” of
the word “individual” and examining Congress’ intent, held that the
TVPA applied only to “natural persons.”59 The Court opined that the
limitation Congress placed on the scope and enforceability of the
statute by intending a narrow definition of “individual” was an
intention that the Court must respect.60
To satisfy the TVPA’s color of law requirement, courts
conduct an agency analysis and consider “jurisprudence under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”61 “Under those principles, ‘[f]or the purposes
of the TVPA, an individual acts under color of law . . . when he
acts together with state officials or with significant state aid.’”62
For example, allegations that a mayor participated in armed
aggression by a private security force against labor unionists in
Guatemala satisfied the TVPA’s color of law requirement.63 In
contrast, where a corporation’s subsidiary was accused of using
paramilitary forces to torture unions leaders, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
paramilitary group was not acting under the color of law unless the
plaintiffs could prove that there was a symbiotic relationship

54 Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
55 Mohammad v. Bin Tarraf, 300 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2008).
56 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252–53 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
57 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
58 Id.
59 Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 456 (2012).
60 Id. at 459.
61 Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 52 (2d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)).
62 Id. at 52–53 (alterations in original) (quoting Klulumani v. Barclay Nat’l
Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d. Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).
63 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248–50
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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between that group and the military or government.64 Lastly, the
alleged offenders must be acting under the authority of “any
foreign nation,” which eliminates the possibility of asserting a
TVPA claim against any United States official.65
If a plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of placing
torture at the hands of an individual who was acting under color
of law of a foreign nation, the claimant must pass yet another
hurdle: an exhaustion of remedies. The TVPA mandates that “[a]
court . . . decline to hear a claim . . . if the claimant has not
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which
the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”66 While the
exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense with the
defendants bearing the burden of proof,67 courts have dismissed
cases where the plaintiff failed to adequately allege the
exhaustion requirement.68
The act of initiating a case under the TVPA serves as prima
facie evidence of meeting the exhaustion requirement, but a
defendant can rebut this presumption with a strong showing that
foreign remedies exist.69 If the defendant succeeds in making that
showing, the burden shifts and the plaintiff would have to prove
that those remedies are not available.70 “Courts in the United
States are familiar with the operation of the exhaustion
requirement” and “do not require exhaustion in a foreign forum
when foreign remedies are unobtainable, ineffective, inadequate,
or obviously futile.”71 Even if a judgment has been rendered against
the plaintiff in a foreign tribunal, that plaintiff may still be
permitted to bring a TVPA claim in U.S. courts if they are able to
show that they suffered from “[an] unfair[ ] . . . judicial system,
unfair procedures, [or a] lack of competence.”72
Lastly, though the TVPA applies to actions that took place
prior to its enactment, TVPA claims are restrained by a ten-year
statute of limitations.73 Ultimately, the ten-year period should be
Id. at 1248.
Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 412
F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
67 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing S.
REP. NO. 102-249, at 9–10 (1991)).
68 See e.g., Rojas Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1331–33
(S.D. Fla. 2009).
69 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9–10 (1991).
70 Id. at 10.
71 Id. (footnotes omitted).
72 Id.
73 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)); see e.g., Friedman v.
Bayer Corp., No. 99 Civ. 3675, 1999 WL 33457825, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1999).
64

65

1364

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

calculated “with a view toward giving justice to plaintiff’s rights.”74
As such, the TVPA allows a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations
any time when the defendant is: (1) absent from the United States;
(2) immune from suit; or (3) concealing their identity.75 Other
instances when tolling is permitted include any time the plaintiff
spends incapacitated or imprisoned, when the plaintiff is unable to
determine the identity of the torturer,76 or during times of war.77
Despite the intention of the TVPA, Bersoum v. Abotaeta—decided in
2017—demonstrates how the TVPA fails victims of torture.
C.

Bersoum v. Abotaeta

Bersoum exemplifies a dichotomy between United States
policy and practice regarding torture victims. In Bersoum, sixtyeight Egyptian citizens brought claims in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York under the Alien Torts
Claims Act, otherwise known as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and
the TVPA against three Libyan citizens.78 Plaintiffs alleged that they
had been tortured by the three named Libyan defendants and others
working at the hands of the defendants.79 It was alleged that the
named defendants were currently serving, or had served, as
members of the Libyan government.80 Plaintiffs alleged that
“Defendants and ‘individuals acting under the authority of the
Libyan government’ threatened Plaintiffs with rape, electrocution
and castration; assaulted them; [and] denied them access to”
necessities like food, water, and life-saving medication.81 Other
allegations included that “[p]laintiffs were flogged and forced to strip
down naked in outdoor locations in cold temperatures” and “one
plaintiff’s thumb was amputated . . . .[a]nother plaintiff was shot in
the knee.”82 The complaint alleged that “[t]o date, these plaintiffs
suffer from permanent psychological and mental illness as a result
of the torture.”83 The plaintiffs’ prayer for relief included a request
for “compensatory damages . . . that is no less than $5,000,000 per

74 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 11 (1991) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.
424, 428 (1965)).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).
78 Bersoum v. Abotaeta, No. 16 Civ. 987, 2017 WL 3446819, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2017).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Complaint at 4, Bersoum v. Abotaeta, No. 16 Civ. 987, 2017 WL 3446819
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017), ECF No. 1.
83 Id.
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plaintiff” and “punitive and exemplary damages . . . that is no less
than $15,000,000 per plaintiff.”84
Defendants never appeared or responded in the action, and
the plaintiffs filed an application for default judgment against the
defendants.85 In support of their application, the plaintiffs alleged
that other sources of remedial action were unavailable because “(1)
they were deported to Egypt immediately after their detention, (2)
there [were] no adequate and available remedies for them to
exhaust in Libya and (3) ‘mounting tensions between Egypt and
Libya . . . have led to border closures and diminishing security’”
which would make reentry in Libya to seek remedies impossible.86
Though the “[p]laintiffs never correctly filed proof of service on the
docket,” the “plaintiff[ ] had the Clerk of Court for the Southern
District of New York mail a copy of the Summons and Complaint
to each Defendant in Libya,” pursuant the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.87 To support their claim that jurisdiction was proper,
the plaintiffs included in the complaint various Libyan connections
to the United States.88 Among those were that “Ansar al-Sharia
[was] blamed for the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi,
Libya,” “[t]he Libyan Mission to the United Nations is located in
the State of New York,” and that “[t]he U.S. government has frozen
over $34 billion in ‘property and interests in property’ of the
government of Libya . . . in the United States.”89
After discussing the standard for deciding whether to
enter a default judgment, the court noted that it is required to
first “assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the
action.”90 The court then stated that it also has the ability to
“assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.”91 By taking on the jurisdictional review, the court
laid the groundwork for the eventual dismissal of the case.
The court first dismissed the claims under the ATS because it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.92 The ATS does not provide
jurisdiction for courts when the alleged actions took place outside of
the United States, and because plaintiffs alleged that all conduct took
Id. at 7.
Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *2.
86 Id. at *1 (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint, Bersoum v. Abotaeta, No.
16 Civ. 987, 2017 WL 3446819 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017), ECF No. 1).
87 Id. at *2.
88 Complaint, supra note 82, at 3.
89 Id.
90 Bersoum v. Abotaeta, No. 16 Civ. 987, 2017 WL 3446819, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2017).
91 Id. (quoting City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
133 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92 Id.
84
85
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place in Libya, the court was bound to dismiss.93 The court then
turned to the claims the plaintiffs brought under “the TVPA, which,
unlike the ATS, [does have] extraterritorial application.”94 Because
the TVPA statutorily creates a civil action that can be brought before
federal courts under the federal question doctrine,95 the court was not
able to dismiss as easily as it had for the ATS claims. Instead of
undertaking the subject matter analysis, the court raised the issue of
personal jurisdiction sua sponte.96 In order for personal jurisdiction to
be proper, the court explained that “three requirements must be
met.”97 “First, the plaintiff’s service or process upon the defendant
must have been procedurally proper. Second, there must be a
statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service of
process effective. Third, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must
comport with constitutional due process principles.”98
On the first issue of whether service was proper, the court
explained that it was not.99 Plaintiffs failed to prove that the
service they purported to complete by way of Rule 4(f)(2) was
proper because they did not submit a receipt or other evidence
that would have satisfied the court to believe the summons and
complaint were actually received by the defendants.100 Failure to
properly serve, the court explained, was one reason the court
could not enter the default judgment sought by the plaintiffs.101
Second, the court held that the plaintiffs were not able to
establish personal jurisdiction on a statutory basis.102 To support
this conclusion, the court laid out the two types of personal
jurisdiction under New York law (applicable here because it was
the forum state): general and specific.103 After characterizing
general jurisdiction as “all-purpose,” the court held that the
defendants were not subject to general jurisdiction under New
York Civil Practice Law Rules (NY CPLR) § 301104 because they
did not have continuous and systematic contact with New
York.105 Next, the court held that the defendants, according to
Id. at *2–3.
Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2014).
95 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
96 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *3.
97 Id.
98 Id. (quoting Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir. 2016)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 (McKinney’s 2018).
105 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *3. “Under the New York courts’ interpretation of
section 301, a non-domiciliary subjects herself to personal jurisdiction in New York [for] . . . any
cause of action if she is ‘engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of “doing business”
here as to warrant a finding of [her] “presence” in this jurisdiction.’” Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v.
93

94
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NY CPLR § 302(a), were not subject to specific personal
jurisdiction in New York because “[t]he Complaint does not
allege that Defendants transacted any business in New York,
committed any tortious acts in or affecting New York, or that
Defendants own, use or possess real property in New York.”106
With personal jurisdiction unavailable under New York law, the
court turned to examine personal jurisdiction under federal law.
Though personal jurisdiction had seemingly been defeated by
the general and specific analysis noted above,107 the court correctly
analyzed a third possibility for conferring jurisdiction over the
defendants. When state statutes fail to establish personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants, Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure acts as a gap filler. The rule states that for claims arising
under federal law, “serving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant
is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the
United States Constitution and law.”108 At first read, Rule 4(k)(2) may
seem to confer jurisdiction over the Libyan defendants, but the court
correctly held that personal jurisdiction was still lacking.109
In correctly determining that even Rule 4(k)(2) was not
enough to confer jurisdiction, the court first laid out the minimum
contacts inquiry used to determine whether personal jurisdiction
would be consistent with the Constitution’s due process
requirements.110 The test asks the court “to consider whether the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.”111 Again, the court was
required to examine whether the defendants may be subject to
either general or specific jurisdiction in the forum state. For general
jurisdiction to lie, the court needed to apply the Daimler test112 to
determine whether the defendant’s contacts were “so continuous
and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.”113 Because the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants
Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 762 (2d. Cir. 1983) (quoting Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 251 N.Y.S. 433, 436
(N.Y. 1964) (alterations and emphasis in original)). This means the non-domiciliary must be
“‘doing business’ in New York ‘not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of
permanence and continuity.’” Id. (quoting Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692, 694 (N.Y. 1982)).
106 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *4.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 95–105.
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
109 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *5.
110 Id. at *4.
111 Id. (quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50,
60 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133 n.11 (2014).
113 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *4 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 133 (2014)).
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had any contacts with New York, the court easily found that there
was not general personal jurisdiction over the defendants.114
To determine whether there was specific jurisdiction, the
court applied the minimum contacts test which “depend[s] on instate activity that give rise to the episode-in-suit.”115 Here, the court
held that there was not specific jurisdiction because the alleged
tortious activity did not take place in New York and the only
contact alleged by the plaintiffs—“that Defendants supported a
military group that had previously attacked a United States
Consulate”—was insufficient to support a finding of the minimum
contacts required for specific jurisdiction.116 Without satisfying the
“continuous and systematic” or “minimum contacts” test, asserting
personal jurisdiction over these defendants would be a violation of
the Constitution.117 After completing the analysis, the court denied
the application for default judgment and dismissed the case.118
The decision in Bersoum v. Abotaeta cuts two ways. In one
sense, the case is a straight-forward example of constitutional due
process serving its purpose of ensuring that only defendants who
are subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States are haled
into court and forced to defend themselves. On the other hand,
the case exemplifies a legal hurdle that the TVPA is often unable
to overcome, rendering the statute virtually meaningless.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND LONG ARM STATUTES

A.

Overview of General and Specific Jurisdiction

While the TVPA grants federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction under the federal question doctrine,119 the issue of
personal jurisdiction is much more complicated. Personal
jurisdiction falls into two categories: general and specific, with the
former being much more difficult for a court to acquire. Put
simply, personal jurisdiction, which arises from due process under
the Constitution,120 refers “to the court’s ability to assert its
authority over a party to the litigation.”121 Therefore, if a court
lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it may not render a
judgment against that defendant.
Id.
Id. (quoting Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 331 (2d Cir. 2016))
116 Id. at *5.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
120 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121 102 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 2 (2008).
114
115
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A court that possesses general personal jurisdiction over
a defendant will be able to hear any claim against that
defendant.122 General jurisdiction over an individual defendant
may be established in multiple ways. The most common way
that a court will possess general jurisdiction over a defendant is
if the court is in the same state as the defendant’s domicile.123
“Domicile is a place, usually a person’s home, to which a person
has a settled connection or to which the law has attached
determinative significance.”124 In the TVPA context, it is unlikely
that a plaintiff will ever be able to rely on general jurisdiction
via the domicile method because torturers who conduct their
illegal activities outside of the United States are unlikely to
move to the United States and establish a domicile there.
Courts may also acquire general jurisdiction over a defendant
if the defendant is physically present in the forum and service of process
is executed against the defendant.125 In 1990, the Supreme Court
affirmed this method of acquiring personal jurisdiction when it stated,
“a State [has] jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present
in the State. . . . [A]nd that once having acquired jurisdiction over such
a person by properly serving him with process, the State could . . . enter
judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.”126 The Court
relied on historical roots to justify this method of acquiring jurisdiction,
and Justice Scalia noted that it was likely to continue by stating, “the
States have overwhelmingly declined to adopt such limitation or
abandonment [of transient jurisdiction], evidently not considering it to
be progress.”127 While a plaintiff seeking to assert a TVPA claim may
be fortunate enough to establish general jurisdiction over a defendant
who is physically present within the United States, such a proposition
is, at best, highly unlikely.
The final way that a court may assert general jurisdiction
over a defendant is if that defendant has established connections
with the forum state that “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render them essentially at home in the forum State.”128 But, “the
question of whether activities-based general jurisdiction is
applicable to individual defendants remains unsolved.”129 Recently
122 An Overview of the Law of Personal (Adjudicatory) Jurisdiction: The United
States Perspective, CHICAGO-KENT COLL. OF L., http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/docs/rfc/
usview.html [https://perma.cc/57U5-V8MS].
123 Emily Eng, Note, A New Paradigm: Domicile As the Exclusive Basis for the Exercise
of General Jurisdiction Over Individual Defendants, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 845, 855 (2012).
124 Id. at 854.
125 Id. at 855.
126 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990).
127 Id. at 627.
128 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014).
129 Eng, supra note 123 at 862.
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though, courts have used the “continuous and systematic” test to
assert general jurisdiction over individual defendants.130 Regardless
of any future Supreme Court rulings on this particular issue, it is
again unlikely that a plaintiff suing a defendant under the TVPA
will be able to argue that the defendant is subject to general
jurisdiction under the “continuous and systematic” test outlined in
Daimler AG v. Bauman and its progeny.131
Unlike general jurisdiction, which provides for any type of
claim against a defendant once general jurisdiction has been
established, “[s]pecific jurisdiction exists when the nonresident
defendant’s contacts with the forum state arise from, or are directly
related to, the causes of action asserted.”132 To determine whether
the defendant’s contacts are sufficient enough to satisfy the
“minimum contacts” test outlined in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, courts consider “the nature and quality of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state; the quantity of those
contacts; the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; the
interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and
the convenience of the parties.”133 In other words, contacts are
sufficient between the defendant and the forum state when the
defendant could anticipate being haled into court in the forum state
and if the exercise of jurisdiction by the court would fall within the
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”134
While due process requires that courts first establish either
general or specific jurisdiction, due process also requires that the
forum state’s long-arm statute is satisfied before a court in that state
can preside over a defendant.135 For claims, like the TVPA, that arise
under federal law, the federal statute may describe the defendants
over whom the statute confers jurisdiction.136 If, however, the federal
statute is silent as to who the court may render a judgment against,
then the court must apply the long-arm statute of the state in which
the court is sitting.137 For example, a federal claim being heard in the
Eastern District for New York, under a federal statute that is silent
regarding potential defendants, will require the court to apply the
long-arm statute of New York.138 In some states, the long-arm
statute will extend as far as the Constitution allows, while in other
Id. at 867.
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
132 102 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 8 (2008).
133 Id. § 5; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
134 102 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 4 (2008).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See id.
130
131

2019]

TVPA TIME TO REWRITE THE RULES

1371

states the long-arm statute may limit the federal court’s jurisdiction
over certain defendants.139 Because the TVPA confers subject matter
jurisdiction, but is silent on personal jurisdiction, courts must apply
the long arm statute of the state where the action was brought.
B.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants Under
Rule 4(k)(2)

Despite not residing in the United States, a foreign
defendant may still be subject to the jurisdiction of United States
courts through the court’s exercise of either general or specific
jurisdiction. In determining whether either of these types of
jurisdiction will lie, courts should undertake the same analyses as
outlined above: namely, the “minimum contacts” test and the
“continuous and systematic” test. Because a foreign defendant may
have contacts with the United States, but fail to meet the
requirements of general jurisdiction or a state’s long-arm statute,
Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a gapfiller.140 Rule 4(k)(2) provides that in this scenario “[s]erving a
summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant” so long as “exercising jurisdiction is
consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”141 Thus,
this gap-filler provides that “notwithstanding a lack of general or
specific jurisdiction over a defendant, he may nonetheless be
subject to personal jurisdiction based on national contacts.”142
Three conditions must be met to invoke Rule 4(k)(2). The
first requirement, that the claim arise under federal law, can be
easily assessed.143 Second, the defendant in question must not be
subject to the general jurisdiction of any state.144 Here, there is a
circuit split regarding the burden of proof.145 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sided with the plaintiff,
noting that it would be extremely difficult for her to prove a
negative, and required that the defendant identify the state in
which general jurisdiction lies if he wishes to use that fact as a
defense.146 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Id.
Laura Beck Knoll, Personal Jurisdiction over Maritime Defendants: Daimler,
Walden, and Rule 4(k)(2), 40 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 130 (2015); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
141 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
142 Knoll, supra note 140, at 130.
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
144 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(A).
145 Knoll, supra note 140, at 131.
146 ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001).
Judge Easterbook explained that the “constitutional analysis at the federal level is unavoidable
but usually simple,” while a constitutional analysis for all 50 states would be a misguided burden
shift. Instead, a defendant with ample contacts with the United States who wishes to avoid the
139
140
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Circuit, however, disagreed with this approach because it
“threatens to place a defendant in a ‘Catch-22’ situation, forcing
it to choose between conceding its potential amenability to suit in
federal court . . . or conceding its potential amenability to suit in
some identified state court.”147 Instead of requiring the defendant
to plead that it is subject to the general jurisdiction in some state,
the First Circuit requires “the plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case of all three elements before the burden shifts to the
defendant.”148 This can be achieved by simply certifying that, with
the information readily available to him, the defendant cannot be
subject to general jurisdiction in any state.149
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, “the burden
shifts to the defendant to produce evidence which, if credited,
would show either that one or more specific states exist in which
[the defendant] would be subject to suit or that its contacts with
the United States are constitutionally insufficient.”150 As Laura
Beck Knoll points out, however, the Daimler opinion makes it
unlikely that a foreign defendant would be subject to general
jurisdiction under the strict “at home” test.151
The last requirement, that exercising jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant under Rule 4(k)(2) must be “consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws,”152 can be a difficult analysis.
For general jurisdiction, the defendant can be evaluated one of two
ways.153 First, a court could ask “whether the foreign defendant
qualifies as ‘at home’ in the United States by considering their
‘nationwide and worldwide’ contacts as in Daimler.”154 Alternatively,
the court could ask “whether the foreign defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the United States ‘as a whole.’”155 Beck
Knoll argues that a recent decision by the Supreme Court indicates
its unwillingness to assert general jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), so
the relevant consideration is whether the defendant is subject to
specific jurisdiction.156

application of Rule 4(k)(2) is charged with naming a state where the suit would properly proceed,
which would effectively amount to “consent to personal jurisdiction [in that state].” Id.
147 United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d. 30, 41 (1st Cir. 1999).
148 Knoll, supra note 140, at 131 (citing Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d at 41).
149 Id. at 132.
150 Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d. at 41.
151 Knoll, supra note 140, at 132.
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(B).
153 See Knoll, supra note 140, at 132.
154 Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 1178, 141–42 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring)).
155 Id. (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 107
(1987) (emphasis added)).
156 Id.
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With regards to specific jurisdiction, Beck Knoll argues that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden v. Fiore, where plaintiffs
attempted to challenge a Georgia police officer’s cash seizure by
bringing suit in Nevada, will further limit the Rule’s application.157 In
Walden, the Court first considered and rejected the idea that
jurisdiction could be created by the contacts between “the
plaintiff . . . and the forum State” and instead reiterated that
jurisdiction is only proper when the “defendant’s suit-related
conduct . . . create[s] a substantial connection with the forum state.”158
Second, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, explained
that the “minimum contacts” test takes into account the defendant’s
conduct and contacts with the selected forum, and not contacts with
those persons residing in the forum.159 While those contacts “may be
intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff,”
the basis for jurisdiction cannot stem from “‘random, fortuitous, or
attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons
affiliated with the State.”160 Thus, it appears from the Court’s
reasoning in Walden that the prospect of a court attaining jurisdiction
over a foreign defendant in the future is becoming less probable,
which will only make it harder for TVPA claims to survive.
C.

The Jurisdiction Problem Exemplified: Bersoum v.
Abotaeta

After considering the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, it is
clear that the legal reasoning in the Bersoum case was correct.
The plaintiffs’ complaint contained a jurisdictional assertion, but
the alleged facts that followed did not meet the legal requirements
to establish personal jurisdiction.161 First, the complaint alleged
that the three defendants were all Libyan citizens who resided in
Libya.162 As discussed above, the fact that the defendants were
non-citizens living abroad made establishing personal jurisdiction
particularly challenging for the plaintiffs in Berosum.163 In an
attempt to overcome this jurisdictional challenge, the complaint
asserted a number of weak connections that the defendants may
have had with the United States.164 The complaint alleged that
“the defendants possessed and exercised command and control
over the Libyan paramilitary group (‘Ansar al-Sharia’)” and that
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 279–81 (2014); Knoll, supra note 140, at 132.
Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
See id.
Id. at 286.
Complaint, supra note 82, at 2–3.
Id. at 2.
See supra Section II.B.
Complaint, supra note 82, at 2–3.
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“Ansar al-Sharia is . . . blamed for the attack on the US Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya.”165 To bolster this contention, the complaint
went on to allege, “[t]he Libyan Defense Ministry, under the
leadership of defendants, has ostensibly provided Ansar al-Sharia
with funding, arms, and, at best, semi-official authority to conduct
its paramilitary activities.”166
The complaint made two more desperate attempts at
establishing personal jurisdiction by stating that “[t]he Libyan
Mission to the United Nations is located in the State of New York”
and that “[t]he U.S. government has frozen over $34 billion in
‘property and property interests’ of the government of Libya.”167
On these facts, the court conducted the “minimum contacts” and
“essentially at home in the forum State” tests.168 As explained
above, both tests failed because the complaint did not allege facts
sufficient to show defendants had the requisite contacts with New
York or the United States as a whole.169
While the court analyzed the personal jurisdiction in this
case correctly, there is still one way that the plaintiffs would have
been able to properly assert jurisdiction. If the defendants ever
entered the territorial boundaries of the United States, the plaintiffs
could personally serve them and, almost magically, personal
jurisdiction would be proper, and the defendants would be forced to
defend the TVPA claim.170 This result is arbitrary. Transient
jurisdiction is premised on territorial and reciprocity theories.171 In
the Burnham case, Justice Brennan leaned on the benefits that a
person enjoys by being present in a state to justify the state’s power
to force that person into court.172 “By visiting the forum State, a
transient defendant[’s] . . . health and safety are guaranteed by the
State’s police, fire, and emergency medical services; he is free to
travel on the State’s roads . . . [and] he likely enjoys the fruits of the
State’s economy.”173 While this may be true in some circumstances,
a defendant who lands at an airport after an international flight has
enjoyed few, if any, of those benefits. Still, he is subject to jurisdiction
under the territorial theory, but in the case of a typical TVPA suit,

Id. at 3.
Id.
167 Id.
168 Bersoum, 2017 WL 3446819, at *4–5.
169 Id.
170 Burnham, v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990).
171 Id. at 611, 623. “Transient jurisdiction” is “jurisdiction premised solely on the
fact that a person is served with process while physically present in the forum State.” Id.
at 629 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
172 Id. at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring).
173 Id. 637–38.
165
166
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the fact that this extremely unlikely event is the only practical way
of obtaining jurisdiction cuts against the purpose of the statute itself.
Putting the technicalities of the personal jurisdiction
analysis aside, the complaint alleged awful acts at the hands of the
defendants.174 Acts that, if true, make the defendants liable in truth
with or without jurisdiction. Plaintiffs were allegedly assaulted and
threatened with rape, electrocution, and castration.175 Without
jumping to a verdict, it is unfathomable that defendants like the
one’s complained of in the Bersoum case are able to escape being
tried for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs are unlikely to ever find
justice in a Libyan court and if the United States and its lawmakers
want to hold torturers accountable for their heinous acts, while also
deterring future torturous acts, there needs to be a change.
III.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
PROBLEM

A.

Elimination of the Statute

The least effective way that Congress could address the
jurisdictional issues presented by the TVPA is by repealing the
TVPA altogether.176 Currently, plaintiffs are forced to relive their
tragic experiences when they, either with or without the help of an
attorney, draft their complaint, craft legal and factual arguments,
and appear in front of federal judges. Unfortunately, these
courageous and resolute plaintiffs often have their claims decided
in the same manner: dismissal. Because of the way that federal
courts currently undertake the personal jurisdiction analysis, few
foreign defendants will ever be subject to the laws of the United
States, and plaintiffs will be left feeling revictimized. If Congress
chose to repeal the TVPA, at least potential plaintiffs would not
have to endure the horrific reality of reliving their past because
they would never bring a claim.
While repealing the TVPA is one solution to the problem
of establishing personal jurisdiction, it is not a solution that
Congress should endorse. The TVPA has the potential to serve
an important purpose, and if it were repealed, torturers around
the world would continue to escape liability. Without a statute
that has extraterritorial application to hold torturers
Complaint, supra note 82, at 4.
Bersoum v. Abotaeta, No. 16 Civ. 987, 2017 WL 3446819, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 10, 2017).
176 For Congress to repeal the twenty-seven-year-old statute, a proposed bill would need
to go through the ordinary lawmaking process. See How Laws Are Made and How to Research
Them, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-are-made [https://perma.cc/6JXG-5L4G].
174

175
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accountable for their evil actions, torturers could feel more
empowered to carry out heinous acts against innocent people.
Furthermore, the repeal of the TVPA, which has the potential of
serving justice on human rights violators would not be in
symmetry with the anti-torture laws that the United States
enforces against its own citizens. The Foreign Relations
Authorization Act provides that
[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than [twenty]
years, . . . and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited
by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any
term of years or for life.177

The law also provides that any person who conspires to commit
torture is subject to the same penalties, with the exception of
death.178 This law applies to nationals of the United States or if
the alleged offender is within the United States.179 Clearly, the
United States has taken a hard stance on torturers within its
own border, and to hold those torturers outside of its borders to
any less of a standard would be asymmetrical.
B.

Refer to an International Court

A better solution than outright repeal of the statute is for
district courts in the United States to refer TVPA claims brought
before it to an international court. One possible venue for TVPA
claims is the International Criminal Court (ICC) based in The
Hague, the Netherlands.180 The court was established in 2002 by
the Rome Statute, which has been signed by 120 of the world’s
states.181 As a matter of law, the tribunal is a court of last resort
and will only try a case “when national courts are unable or
unwilling [to] keep their responsibility to prosecute atrocities at
home.”182 To that end, the court operates on an opt-in basis and
“states must choose to accept its jurisdiction and agree to enforce
its law, cooperate with its decisions, and provide it with the
political support for its effective functioning.”183 One possible
reason that states may choose to avoid signing the Rome Statute
177 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-236, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 382, 463 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2012)).
178 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(c).
179 Id. § 2340A(b).
180 ICC Basics, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.coalitionfortheicc.
org/explore/icc-basics [https://perma.cc/FVM7-MG38].
181 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 91–92; ICC Basics, supra note 180.
182 ICC Basics, supra note 180.
183 Id.
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is that “[i]t expressly removes immunities for state officials
including heads of state or government.”184
As it is currently constructed, the ICC has a limited
reach, and, therefore, its ability to handle a TVPA claim may be
handcuffed. First, the ICC is a criminal court, but the TVPA only
provides for a civil action brought against individuals for money
damages.185 The ICC currently only tries individuals for
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.186 Victims of these crimes are able to proceed in the
prosecution of their offenders and may “receive reparations for
harm suffered.”187 The ICC, however, does not provide for the
types of torture claims that are the subject of the TVPA, unless
those types of claims are widespread enough to be included
within the ICC’s definition of “crimes against humanity.”188 In
order to be considered a “crime against humanity” under the ICC
requirement, the crime must be: (1) an attack directed against
civilian populations; (2) widespread or systematic; (3) pursuant
to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy; (4) with
knowledge of the attack by the perpetrator.189
The biggest hurdle for referring a TVPA claim to the ICC
would be the requirement that states opt-in to accept its jurisdiction,
which includes only the specified crimes “committed either (I) on the
territory of a state party to the Rome Statute; or (II) by a national of
a state party to the Rome Statute, irrespective of the location.”190
Glaringly, nations like Libya, a state not known for adhering to the
rule of law, did not sign the Rome Statute, making the ICC obsolete
in a case like Bersoum.191 Perhaps surprisingly, the United States
has also not signed the Rome Statute, so a referral from a United
States district court to the ICC would be logically contradictory.192
Id.
ICC Crimes, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT http://www.coalitionfor
theicc.org/explore/icc-crimes [https://perma.cc/9ALM-ETCH]; Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
186 Rome Statute, supra note 181, at art 5, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 92.
187 ICC Basics, supra note 180.
188 Id.
189 Rome Statute, supra note 181, at art 7, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 93–94; ICC Crimes,
supra note 185.
190 ICC Basics, supra note 180; see also AMNESTY INT’L UK, LIBYA: RULE OF
LAW OR RULE OF MILITIAS? 5–11 (2012) https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/up
loads/2017/04/2012_-_007_-_rule_of_law_or_militias_formatted.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X7C5-5FDV] (recounting human rights abuses and violations in Libya perpetrated by
armed militias in contravention of the rule of law).
191 The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, https://
asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%
20the%20rome%20statute.aspx#L [https://perma.cc/M834-FVGR].
192 Id.
184
185

1378

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

If the ICC’s shortcomings are ignored and it is assumed that
a TVPA claim is referable, a potential plaintiff must consider the
prudence of such a referral. First, it is important to reiterate that the
ICC is strictly a criminal court.193 Second, the ICC will only have
jurisdiction over alleged crimes if (1) the crime is referred to the court
by a state party; (2) the UN Security Council makes a referral; or (3)
a preliminary examination is launched by the ICC prosecutor.194
While a transfer from a district court is not a scenario in which the
ICC would have jurisdiction, this note contemplates such a scenario
and applies established case law surrounding the issue of forum non
conveniens for the consideration of such a transfer.
The Supreme Court has held that, despite “a strong
presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum,”195 courts
should balance the public and private factors to determine if a
transfer on forum non conveniens grounds is warranted.196 Courts
consider public factors such as congestion, deciding a localized
controversy at home, the forum’s familiarity with applying the
governing law, the potential for conflict when applying foreign law,
and the burdens of jury duty.197 Applied to the Bersoum case, the
public factors weigh against transferring the claim to a foreign
court.198 TVPA claims arise under U.S. federal law, which district
courts are seasoned in applying and the potential for a conflict of law
is eliminated. Moreover, TVPA claims, unlike fair labor actions or
habeas petitions,199 are not numerous enough to cause congestion in
the courts or severely burden juries.200
Though the public factors weigh against a transfer, private
factors must also be analyzed. The Supreme Court outlined the
following private factors for consideration: (1) the “ease of access to
sources of proof”; (2) the availability of compulsory process and costs
of producing witnesses; (3) previewing the premises; and (4) “all other
practical problems,” such as joining a defendant.201 Applied to the facts
from Bersoum, the private factors, like the public factors, weigh
against transferring the case to an international court like the ICC.
ICC Basics, supra note 180.
How the ICC Works, ABA-ICC PROJECT https://how-the-icc-works.aba-icc.org/
[https://perma.cc/5N5U-SJQ5].
195 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
196 Id. at 257.
197 Id. at 241 n.6.
198 See supra Section III.B.
199 Lydia DePillis, Why Wage and Hour Litigation is Skyrocketing, WASH. POST (Nov.
25, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/25/people-are-suing-morethan-ever-over-wages-and-hours/?utm_term=.fe46eb107671 [https://perma.cc/P3XX-X98S].
200 The Supreme Court has only addressed the TVPA four times. Human Rights,
supra note 43, at III.E-27.
201 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 508 (1947)).
193
194
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Because the ICC is based in The Hague, the Netherlands, access to
proof and witness related matters are arguably just as costly and
burdensome as they would be for a court in the United States.
Similarly, previewing the premises where the conduct took place and
joining a defendant are just as difficult for the ICC as they would be
for a U.S. district court. Even if the court were to decide on
transferring the claim, the United States would not be able to ensure
that the international court is carrying out Congress’ intent. With a
transfer to the ICC blocked from both legal and practical standpoints,
it is up to the Supreme Court to ensure that the TVPA is not toothless.
IV.

JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE JURISDICTION PROBLEM

A.

Apply Burnham Philosophies to Foreign Defendants

There are questions about whether non-citizens should
receive the benefits of U.S. laws without also bearing the burden of
those laws. In essence, U.S. law protects TVPA defendants by
preventing their appearance in court while also attempting to serve
justice on those same wrongdoers.202 Despite their non-citizen
status, foreign TVPA defendants are currently able to skirt
Congress’ specific intent and unjustly avoid even the prospect of
liability by citing the Constitution’s due process limits on personal
jurisdiction.203 The philosophies of Justice Brennan’s concurrence
in the Burnham decision should be extended to include foreign
defendants enjoying the protections of the Constitution.204 Like the
person who steps into a state and is protected by that state’s police
and fire department and is therefore subject to personal
jurisdiction,205 the alleged TVPA offender who is constantly
protected by the U.S. Constitution should be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the United States. By counterbalancing the
protections a foreigner receives under the Constitution with the
proposed catchall provision that extends personal jurisdiction over
human rights violators, citizens of all nations would be able to
effectively pursue suits against torturers.

See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
Daniel Fisher, Does the Constitution Protect Non-Citizens? Judges Say Yes, FORBES
(Jan. 30, 2017, 12:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/01/30/does-the-const
itution-protect-non-citizens-judges-say-yes/#667c8d54f1de [https://perma.cc/EV5C-NS99].
204 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 637–38 (1990) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
205 Id. at 637–38.
202
203
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Broaden the Definition of “Contacts”

A court hearing a TVPA claim against a foreign defendant
may have more traditional means of asserting personal
jurisdiction. While it is unlikely that a foreign defendant will ever
be “essentially at home in the forum state”—simply because they
live in another country that is their true home and the TVPA does
not apply against corporations—an individual defendant may pass
the “minimum contacts” test depending on how broadly the court
views those contacts. While the minimum contacts test was
originally set out in International Shoe,206 the contacts considered
by courts has been ever-evolving. In McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., for example, the Supreme Court held that business
contacts of the defendant were enough to establish jurisdiction
because the business was related to the suit.207 In the Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz case, the Court held that a state may have
jurisdiction over a defendant who has never even entered that state
if the defendant purposefully directs his activities at the state.208
Similarly, in the Calder v. Jones case, from which the Calder effects
test grew,209 the Court held that a defendant may be haled into a
state’s courts if the defendant acted intentionally to cause harm in
the forum state.210 As summarized in Walden, “[t]he [Due Process]
inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”211
Applying these principles to the facts of Bersoum, it may be
possible to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners like the Libyan
defendants. First, like the business contacts from McGee,212 it is likely
that the Libyan defendants, all of whom worked for the Libyan
government, are connected, either by way of wages, investments, or
funding, with the monies held by the Libyan government within the
United States.213 Similarly, any “individual who acts under the actual
or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation” will have
contacts with the United States by way of that government’s property,

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
208 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).
209 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
210 Id. at 789–90.
211 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)).
212 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
213 David S. Cohen, U.S. Freezes At Least $30 Billion in Libyan Assets, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/US-FreezesAt-Least-$30-Billion-in-Libyan-Assets.aspx [https://perma.cc/CXM5-E3HY].
206

207
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money or otherwise, within the United States.214 If courts are willing
to make the jump from the individual who commits the torture to the
nation that funds and supports the torture, then personal jurisdiction
may be proper on account of those “contacts” that the foreign nation
has with the United States.215 Furthermore, from a damages
perspective, a foreign government’s assets located within the United
States should be available to satisfy judgments against otherwise
judgment-proof defendants. If courts were willing to connect the
offenders with their supporters, the TVPA would regain its bite and
fulfill its legislative purpose.
Courts could also attempt to satisfy the minimum contacts
test against a TVPA defendant by considering the purpose of torture
and its effects on the United States. After conducting an analysis
under the Burger King and Calder framework, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Mwani v. bin Laden,
held that foreign defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction
because their actions were “purposefully directed . . . at residents of
the United States.”216 The court reasoned that the bombing at issue
was intended to “cause pain and sow terror in . . . the United
States.”217 If TVPA claimants are able to allege facts that the actions
of defendants were directed at harming the United States and its
residents, then perhaps minimum contacts would be satisfied.
There is an argument to be made that every instance of
human rights violations, including torture, is an act directed against
democracy and capitalism, two cornerstones of a free and civilized
society.218 More concretely, extrajudicial killings, also protected
against by the TVPA, allows for an easier “targeting” analysis. The
theoretical plaintiff who lives in the United States and loses a loved
214 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
215 In 2017, a court found that the U.S. government was permitted to seize an Iranian
controlled building in Manhattan to complete a “terrorism-related civil forfeiture.” The sale of the
building would be used to pay a portion of the damages due to victims’ families from the September
11th attacks. Vivian Wang, Manhattan Skyscraper Linked to Iran Can Be Seized by U.S., Jury
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/650-fifthavenue-iran-terrorism.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2STD-Z74L]. Similarly, the New York Court of
Appeals held in Rasheed Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie “that the ‘[r]epeated, deliberate use [of a New
York correspondent account] that is approved by the foreign bank on behalf and for the benefit of a
customer’ satisfied” New York’s long-arm statute, establishing personal jurisdiction. Al Rushaid v.
Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316, 327 (2016); Jamie L. Boucher et al., New York Court of Appeals Finds
‘Repeated, Deliberate Use’ of Correspondent Account Sufficient to Establish Personal Jurisdiction
Over Non-U.S. Bank, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Dec. 5, 2016) (alterations in
original), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/12/new-york-court-of-appeals-finds
-repeated-deliberat [https://perma.cc/N6TY-GEC7].
216 Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
217 Id.
218 Edward Younkins, The Conceptual Foundations of Democratic Capitalism, SOCIAL
CRITIC (1998) http://www.quebecoislibre.org/younkins16.htm [https://perma.cc/H8BN-BUN3].
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one at the hands of an extrajudicial killing, should have an easy time
establishing jurisdiction under the Calder effects test. The defendant
in that instance should be haled into court because his actions were
directed at the family member residing in the United States.
C.

Rewrite Rule 4(k)(2)

An explicit catchall in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to prevent torturers from slipping through jurisdictional cracks
would be better than both of the above approaches. The Judicial
Conference should propose, and the Supreme Court should approve,
an amendment to Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because it is the only way to ensure that the TVPA’s aim
be fulfilled.219 The Judicial Conference, which is comprised of chief
judges from each circuit, a district judge from each regional circuit,
and the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, uses a
Standing Committee and advisory rules committees to “‘carry on a
continuous study of the operation and effect’ of the federal rules.”220
When reviewing the rules and determining the need for
amendments, the Judicial Conference is responsible for promoting:
“simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just
determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay.”221
If the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules were to
examine the chilling impact that Rule 4(k)(2) has on TVPA
claims, they could draft a contemplated amendment that would
better align with the goals of the rules. The draft amendment
would first be open to “comments from the bench, bar, and
general public.”222 After considering the comments, the proposed,
and possibly revised, amendment would then be reviewed by the
Standing Committee, who should recommend the changes be
adopted by Supreme Court.223 The Supreme Court should then
review and promulgate the amended rule into effect by order.224
219 How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS https://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works [https://perma.cc/
MZ7Q-ZXSZ]. Congress delegated rulemaking authority for federal courts to the federal
judiciary through the Rules Enabling Act. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, Pub. L. No.
73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012)).
220 How the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 219 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)).
221 Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, US COURTS https://www.
uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/
overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://perma.cc/TB4V-HQJ5].
222 How the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 219.
223 Id.
224 Id. Though Congress has the ability to reject the amendment through new
legislation or defer its effective date, it should take no action, allowing the amended Rule
4(k)(2) to become effective the same year it was approved by the Court. Id.
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By amending Rule 4(k)(2) to create a constitutional carve
out allowing for human rights violators to be brought before U.S.
courts, the Supreme Court of the United States could solve the
jurisdictional problem that the TVPA currently presents. Without
an amendment to the Rules, courts are unlikely to change their
current jurisdictional analysis under both the theory of
reciprocity and “minimum contacts.” If Rule 4(k)(2) were to
remain unchanged, courts will adhere to the status quo, and the
United States will continue to allow human rights violators to
escape liability for conduct that falls squarely within an
internationally accepted definition of torture.
Currently, the language of Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules
may already trick the casual reader into thinking that it is already
possible to bring a foreigner before a federal district court because
it states: “serving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant if . . . the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction.”225 However, the next
subsection of the rule prevents defendants like those in Bersoum
from being haled into court by providing that in order for
jurisdiction to be proper, it must be “consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.”226 It is ultimately this particular
subsection that prevents defendants in TVPA claims from being
tried in U.S. courts unless those defendants pass the “minimum
contacts” or “essentially at home in the forum state” tests.227 An
amendment to the language of Rule 4(k)(2) that specifically confers
personal jurisdiction over individuals who are alleged to have
committed human rights violations means the United States would
finally be able to fully realize the purpose of the TVPA.
The Advisory Committee and Standing Committee, when
drafting the amendment to Rule 4(k)(2), must be careful to
remember the deficiencies of Rule 4(k)(2) in its current form. By
explicitly stating, then, that human rights violators are subject to
personal jurisdiction of any federal district court regardless of the
constraint put on foreign defendants by Rule 4(k)(2)(B), the TVPA
would regain its bite. The amended Rule would make clear for courts
that they need not undertake the minimum contacts analysis.
Instead, a defendant who is quickly and automatically within the
court’s jurisdiction will no longer be able to rely on the procedural
roadblock, discovery will proceed, and perhaps plaintiffs will be a

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
Id.
227 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014).
225
226
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step closer to feeling a sense of justice.228 Additionally, torturers will
be deterred from carrying out their evil conduct, and would face
considerable monetary consequences if found liable in court.229
Lastly, by permitting fact discovery to proceed, courts could initiate
a “freeze and seize,”230 so that plaintiffs who prevail on their claims
would receive not only a favorable judgment, but also a damages
award designed to compensate them for their traumatic experiences.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the TVPA falls short of meeting its goal of holding
human rights violators around the world accountable. When
considering whether to pass the statute, Congress highlighted that
the TVPA was designed to address acts that “violate standards
accepted by virtually every nation” and codified what had otherwise
“assumed the status of customary international law.”231
Unfortunately, the TVPA has not been successful in its attempt to
carry out justice because U.S. courts rarely find that they have
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.232 Because courts lack
jurisdiction, these defendants are not only free from answering for
their conduct, but are also undeterred from committing similar evil
acts in the future.233
Congress can address the TVPA’s deficiencies in a variety of
ways. First, it could choose to repeal the TVPA altogether. Repealing
would have the same effect as allowing the TVPA to continue
without an expansion of personal jurisdiction. While torturers would
not be deterred and would not face legal consequences, victims of
torture would not be revictimized by believing that they could
prevail on a TVPA claim only to find out later that their time, effort,
and money in securing a lawyer and filing a claim were defeated on
personal jurisdiction grounds. Alternatively, courts could expand
their personal jurisdiction analyses to meet the demands of
228 NAT’L CRIME VICTIM BAR ASS’N, CIVIL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 4–5
(2001), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/Public%20Folders/Civil%20Justice%20-%20FINAL%2
0(non-book).pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/Y4HZ-8PYS].
229 The TVPA provides for the recovery of damages from defendants found liable
for torture. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)); see, e.g., Mehinovic v.
Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (where defendant was ordered to
pay each of four plaintiffs ten million dollars in compensatory damages and twenty-five
million dollars in punitive damages).
230 See Stephen Moskowitz, Freeze and Seize Law – California, TAX LAWYER
BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010) https://moskowitzllp.com/freeze-seize-law-california/ [https://perma
.cc/LXM5-4EWJ] (discussing cases where California’s “freeze and seize” law was used to
ensure restitution payments).
231 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
232 See supra Section II.B.
233 See supra Section II.B.
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globalization. By allowing more attenuated contacts or viewing
torture and extrajudicial killings as an attack on the United States,
the courts could more frequently exercise jurisdiction over foreign
defendants. Still, this solution relies on a theoretical approach that
courts have been reluctant to endorse and could allow TVPA
violators to escape any liability.
The clearest and most efficient way to cure the challenges in
succeeding on a TVPA claim would be for the Supreme Court to
explicitly allow for personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants who
commit human rights violations by adopting an amended Rule
4(k)(2). By expanding the Rule to hale foreign defendants into court,
fact discovery could proceed, evidence of international crimes could
be brought to light, and plaintiffs may well force their offenders to
face justice.
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